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A reassessment of E.H. Carr and the realist tradition: Britain, German-
Soviet Relations and neoclassical realism 
Abstract 
E.H. Carr’s connection to realism has increasingly been called into question. Revisionist 
literature has pointed to realism’s narrow understanding of Carr and drawn from his wider 
body of work in order to problematize Carr’s association with realism. Given that it 
overlooks two key texts produced by Carr, the revisionist literature is incomplete. Refocusing 
on Britain and German-Soviet Relations, especially the way in which they reflect ideas 
associated with the realist tradition, this paper demonstrates the continued traditional link 
between Carr and realism. Having done so, it considers the contemporary relevance of Carr’s 
lesser known realist work. Drawing parallels between Britain and German-Soviet Relations 
and neoclassical realism, the paper contends that Carr’s forgotten texts can serve as the 
foundation for a more classically orientated, European mode of neoclassical realism. 
Introduction 
For at least the last two decades, International Relations (IR) has undertaken what has been 
termed a historiographical turn (Bell, 2001). The reasons for this are relatively 
straightforward and documented elsewhere: following the end of the Cold War, if not before, 
the discipline’s hegemonic truths became increasingly contested. Much of the work here has 
focused on destabilising our traditional understanding of the first great debate (e.g. Schmidt, 
2012) in addition to presenting a more accurate and refined understanding of canonical, 
typically realist thinkers (e.g. Williams, 2007; Bell, 2009). In terms of the latter, much work 
has offered a more nuanced understanding of classical realist authors, seeking to challenge 
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realism’s colonisation of these texts and draw parallels with contemporary critical approaches 
(e.g. Behr and Molloy, 2013). 
Aligned with this trend, a more specific literature has questioned the typical 
disciplinary understanding of E.H. Carr. This focus is understandable as E.H. Carr broadly 
and The Twenty Years’ Crisis specifically (whether or not intentionally) played a pivotal role 
in the development of the discipline’s historical narrative (Dunne et al, 1998). The revisionist 
literature, which will be discussed below, has increasingly questioned the orthodox depiction 
of Carr and his most (in)famous text by drawing attention to the texts produced by Carr in the 
interwar and postwar era. This literature is more incomplete than inaccurate, however, 
because it overlooks two texts, Britain and German-Soviet Relations, which were written by 
Carr in the same period. Utilising Haslam’s (2002) tour de horizon of realist thought, this 
paper makes the case that a more authentic realism can be found in these overlooked texts. 
The analysis is subsequently extended by illustrating points of convergence and divergence 
between these lost texts and contemporary realist approaches, specifically neoclassical 
realism. 
The discussion below draws from Steele’s (2013, pp. 741–743) double movement of 
restoration and contemporary reconstruction. The former entails trying to restore a classical 
text as one would attempt (as much as is possible) to restore a building to its original form. 
The latter, in contrast, involves teasing out the implications of a classical text and bringing 
them to bear on contemporary scholarly debates. The paper begins by sketching out the 
revisionist turn and the manner in which it has reshaped our understanding of Carr broadly 
and The Twenty Years’ Crisis specifically. Importantly, the revisionist literature’s 
incompleteness – its oversight of Britain and German-Soviet Relations – is highlighted. This 
necessitates the second section, which, using a number of realist principles as focal points, 
restores Britain and German-Soviet Relations to the realist tradition. The third section then 
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ponders on the relationship between Carr’s lost work and neoclassical realism. It argues that 
Britain and German-Soviet Relations can exploit the transatlantic divide in terms of 
contemporary neoclassical realist work and serve as the foundation for a more classically 
orientated, European mode of neoclassical realism. 
Revisionism and The Twenty Years’ Crisis 
Revisionist historiography is concerned with challenging taken-for-granted truths and 
conventions (Ashworth, 2014, p. 15). It entails digging ‘deeper into the history [of IR]’, 
which ultimately involves painting ‘a picture that is far more textured, much more 
complicated, and altogether interesting, than the one we normally present to our first year 
students’ (Cox, 2012, p. xiv). In terms of Carr and The Twenty Years’ Crisis, this entails 
questioning his relationship to realism. Historically and conventionally Carr’s relationship to 
realism has been affirmed. Thomson (1980), as an example, writes that Carr laid ‘the 
foundations for political realism’ (p. 69). Contemporary scholars reproduce this idea. As an 
example, Mearsheimer (2005) notes that Carr’s attack on utopian intellectualism earned Carr 
‘his realist spurs’ (p. 141). Revisionists question this understanding. Generally, the revisionist 
view can be distilled to two points: first, The Twenty Years’ Crisis in particular has been 
misunderstood at the very least or, more nefariously, misrepresented; and second, Carr more 
widely has been mischaracterised because the traditional view has tended to reduce his 
contribution to The Twenty Years’ Crisis instead of appreciating the breadth and depth of his 
writings on international affairs. 
To take the latter point first, Wilson (2001) writes of a typically held view in the field 
that ‘Carr’s contribution to international relations begins and ends with The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis’, which is a view that Wilson terms ‘damaging…not only for our understanding of his 
thought as a whole, but also our understanding of [The Twenty Years’ Crisis] itself’ (p. 125). 
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Johnston (1967) and Evans (1975) were the first to broaden the typically held narrow view by 
disagreeing over the extent to which Carr’s explanation for the breakdown of order was 
congruent across The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Conditions of Peace and Nationalism and After. 
Howe (1994) followed suit by pointing to the evident critical edge underpinning these three 
texts. Subsequently Linklater (1997) showed the importance of a more expansive 
understanding of citizenship buttressing The Twenty Years’ Crisis and Nationalism and After 
specifically. More extensive monographs followed by Jones (1998) and Haslam (2000) in 
which biographical details often overlooked were given fuller consideration. Cox’s (2004) 
edited collection, which included contributions from specialists in IR, history and 
Sovietology, equally served as a reminder that Carr’s thought was more extensive and indeed 
more interesting than the traditional view gave him credit for. And, more recently, work has 
sought to recover Carr’s romantic biographical period (Nishimura, 2011), consider the ethical 
positions underlying his work (Molloy, 2013), reconsider Carr’ s historical understanding of 
the state (Kostagiannis, 2013) and stress the influence of Frankfurt critical theory on The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis and What is History (Babík, 2013). Gone, in other words, is the 
traditional depiction of Carr; in its place is a more plural understanding, which is best 
captured in Wilson’s (2001) depiction of Carr as a ‘“sort-of-
Realist/Functionalist/Keynesian/Marxist-influenced/Proto-IR-Critical Theorist”’ (p. 130). 
The broadening of our understanding of Carr’s contribution to IR has enhanced our 
understanding of his most (in)famous text, The Twenty Years’ Crisis. In turn, the depiction of 
it as realism par excellence has been undermined. Booth (1991), as an example, concludes 
that the traditional depiction of it as an attack on utopianism ‘failed to note [Carr’s] 
uncertainty, his criticism of realism and his positive comments about utopianism’ (p. 531). 
Likewise, Jones (1998) observes that familiarity with Carr and The Twenty Years’ Crisis ‘has 
gone hand in hand with deep confusion about the interpretation of his work’ (p. 3). More 
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scathingly, perhaps, Cox in his preface to the text’s reissue suggests that its meaning was 
purposefully bent out of shape in order to legitimise a particular way of thinking about 
international affairs at the onset of the Cold War. In turn, it definitely came close to becoming 
‘the least understood book in the history of international relations’ (Carr, 2001, p. xiii). 
Whether the text’s meaning was misconstrued or manipulated is not the concern here. 
What is clear, however, is that the text’s progressive aspects make its relationship to the 
realist tradition problematic. Wilson (2012) defines progressive change as the ‘belief that the 
world does not have to look the way that it does, and that through reason, courage, 
imagination and determination it is possible to arrive at a better way of being and living’ (p. 
135). In contrast to this hopeful outlook, realists ‘can generally be counted on to take a 
pessimistic or “Augustinian” view of the behaviour of man or society or both in the conduct 
of international relations’ (Haslam, 2002, p. 12). It is the former elements, as others have 
pointed out, which have been downplayed in the conventional understanding of Carr (Booth, 
1991; Howe, 1994; Linklater, 1997). 
Moreover, the conventional understanding of the text has typically focused on Carr’s 
attack on the utopian tendency of neglecting of power (Mearsheimer, 2005, p. 140). This has 
helped conceal his attack on realism as determinism. Take the very first paragraph of the first 
edition’s preface as an example. According to Carr (1946), it was ‘written at a time when war 
was already casting its shadow on the world, but when all hope of averting it was not yet lost’ 
(p. ix, my emphasis). The criticism that Carr (1946, p. 10, 89–94) makes of realism, which 
has often been overlooked by realists, was in actuality a critique of determinism. In this 
respect, as Carr (1936) did elsewhere, he was in actuality arguing, in part, that war with 
Germany could be averted – it was not inevitable. The purpose here is not to launch an attack 
on Carr, however easy that with the benefit of hindsight may be (Fox, 1985). Rather the 
purpose here is to recognise that, to reflect on The Twenty Years’ Crisis in terms of 
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contemporary scholarship, there is a lot more Ikenberry (2008) than Mearsheimer (2010) in 
the text (not discounting the text’s more radical/Marxist undertones and its attack on abstract 
liberal internationalism) (Cox, 1999, 2010). 
After taking on board the revisionist literature on Carr, where does that leave us in 
terms of our understanding of The Twenty Years’ Crisis and Carr’s thought as a whole? More 
importantly, why call Carr a realist after all these (revisionist) years? After all, Jones (1998) 
observes that, although ‘he eludes easy textbook classification’, Carr ‘was a realist of some 
kind or other’ (p. 144); Cox concludes that Carr was a realist if of ‘a very different sort’ 
(Carr, 2001, p. xl); and Haslam (2002), perhaps in a less guarded moment, suggests that Carr 
was not dissatisfied with his machtpolitik image ‘because he recognised the image to be not 
altogether inaccurate’ (p. 200). In the next section I begin to unpack the ideas found in two 
texts, often overlooked by both realists and revisionists, which offer a clue as to why Carr’s 
connection with realism is not only apt but is in fact even stronger given contemporary 
developments in the realist tradition.  
Restoration: Britain, German-Soviet Relations and the realist tradition 
I am referring here specifically to two texts produced by Carr on British, German and Soviet 
interwar diplomacy. Britain (1939) offered an explanation for British interwar policy that was 
sympathetic to both international (relative decline) and domestic (partisan politics) 
conditions. German-Soviet Relations (1951) outlined how these two nations were compelled 
by international conditions to seek a rapprochement during the interregnum, but significant 
attention was paid to pivotal individuals such as Gustav Stresemann, Germany’s Foreign 
Minister throughout most of the 1920s, and Karl Radek, who amongst other things helped 
negotiate the Brest-Litovsk treaty and, from a prison cell, helped re-establish diplomatic links 
between the Soviet Union and Germany. The combined focus on both international factors 
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(relative power) and domestic or unit-level factors (individuals and party politics) mean that 
these texts should, at the very least, be of interest to neoclassical realists. Indeed, in the third 
section of this paper I will make the case that this theoretical development in the realist 
literature makes Carr’s (at least the Carr that wrote Britain and German-Soviet Relations) 
connection to realism more evident. Unfortunately, realists broadly tend to reduce Carr’s 
contribution to The Twenty Years’ Crisis, meaning that Britain and German-Soviet Relations 
have effectively been lost by realists (this point will be developed further in the subsequent 
section). The revisionist literature is also limited here in certain respects as the focus is 
instead on other texts in Carr’s corpus (i.e. Conditions of Peace, Nationalism and After and 
What is History).1 If it is true that we must appreciate Carr’s work as a whole to understand 
his political thought in toto (Wilson, 2001, p. 125), then this oversight is in need of 
correction. 
To do so, it is first necessary to outline what is actually meant by realism. Typically, 
this is normally addressed by outlining some core theoretical assumptions e.g. state-centrism, 
the pervasiveness of anarchy and the centrality of power (Walt, 1997, p. 932). The problem 
with such theoretical constructs, however, is that they tend to impose ‘upon a loose and 
fragmented assemblage of thought a degree of coherence which is arguably unjustified and 
unnecessary’ (Haslam, 2002, p. 249). Rather than thinking about realism in terms of its 
theoretical assumptions, therefore, it is perhaps wiser to think about realism in terms of 
tradition. Traditions of thought are webs of beliefs and ideas which political thinkers inherit. 
They are, as Sterling-Folker (2009) notes, ‘imagined communities of thought that provide a 
label and history for beliefs and practices’ (p. 199). Following Haslam (2002), it is possible to 
conceive of the realist tradition in terms of four beliefs/ideas: raison d'état; the balance of 
power; the balance of trade; and geopolitics.2 
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The restoration of Britain and German-Soviet Relations will follow shortly, and at the 
same time it will draw from Haslam’s beliefs/ideas to demonstrate the linkages between 
Carr’s forgotten texts and the realist tradition. First, however, I shall attempt to pre-empt the 
criticism that may be raised should one follow this “key concepts” approach. Hall and Bevir 
(2014) contend that as traditions of thought are inherited and, equally importantly, that 
thinkers have agency to ‘nurture, squander, build upon, or even reject’ traditions, then 
traditions cannot be thought of as ‘having “fixed cores”’ (p. 828). Core ideas, in other words, 
rise and fall in importance in term of the thinker/scholar and the context they inhabit. This 
view is repeated by Sterling-Folker (2009) who argues that traditions ‘have no objective, 
natural core that determines what falls in and outside of their domains’; instead they are 
‘naturally incoherent and depend on creative, shifting, changing, and adaptive acts of will 
among those who subscribe to them’ (p. 198). To start with no basic ideas makes the task of 
assessing the extent of a shared tradition problematic if not impossible, however. Moreover, 
recognising that shared themes exist in the realist tradition does not equate to accepting an 
essentialist understanding of these concepts, which is one of the chief arguments that Haslam 
(2002, p. 249) makes in his monograph. Following O’Driscoll’s (2015, p. 2) invocation of 
Lloyd’s bridgeheads of intelligibility, I use Haslam’s four beliefs not as essentialist ideas but 
as a focal point around which to enable the comparison of Carr’s thoughts in Britain and 
German-Soviet Relations and the realist tradition more broadly.  
The stretching out of hands across the ideological divide 
German-Soviet Relations was in effect a traditional diplomatic history. It was based on set of 
six lectures that Carr delivered as part of the Albert Shaw diplomatic history series in late 
1950 and early 1951 (Haslam, 2000, pp. 148–149). The initial spur for the lectures and 
subsequent monograph was Carr’s continuing work on his history of the Soviet revolution. In 
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a letter to Isaac Deutscher Carr explained that the lectures and subsequent monograph were 
‘“a sort of first draft”’ (Haslam, 2000, p. 149) for his history’s third volume. The principal 
theme was the manner in which these two outcasts from Versailles managed, owing to 
international conditions and despite of ideological differences, to reach two geopolitically 
critical alliances during the course of the interregnum. Carr (1951) termed it the ‘stretching 
out of hands across the ideological barrier’ (p. 48), which obviously fits rather snuggly with 
the idea of raison d'état. 
The context to the book is obviously evident. Haslam (2000) provides the most 
complete overview (pp. 149–154). Specifically, we are looking at the early Cold War and 
Carr’s hoped for middle ground – or balance – between the United States and Soviet Russia 
as well as his deference to Soviet Russia. The former runs through much of German-Soviet 
Relations, specifically the chapter on Stresemann’s diplomatic skill – what Carr (1951) 
referred to as his skill for exercising ‘a great economy of truth’ (p. 89) – for balancing 
between east and west. The connection with Carr’s own proclivities is obvious. Moreover, 
German-Soviet Relations touches upon the pacification of the Soviet Union (at least in terms 
of foreign policy). Carr (1951) noted, as an example, the effects of the 1921 New Economic 
Policy, which stimulated ‘the development of “normal relations” between Soviet Russia and 
the capitalist countries, and [relegated] international revolution to the background as an 
element of Soviet diplomacy’ (p. 39). In effect, this meant that Soviet policy toward Germany 
was dictated more by raison d'état and less by revolutionary fervour, meaning that the failure 
of the aborted Moscow-backed Communist uprising in October 1923 was the last attempt at 
fomenting socialism in Germany. ‘Never again were the expectations of an early revolution 
in Germany allowed to override the normal considerations of foreign policy’, wrote Carr 
(1951), ‘Never again would Comintern pursue an independent policy of its own’ (p. 76).  
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It should be evident from the above that raison d'état was central to Carr’s diplomatic 
history of German and Soviet relations between the wars. Balance of power, balance of trade 
and geopolitics were equally critical. Carr explained the Rapallo treaty in terms of relative 
power. ‘The time would come in the nineteen-thirties when Germany could afford to abandon 
the policy of the balance’, wrote Carr (1951), ‘and by that time Soviet Russia was also strong 
enough to make a choice between Germany and the western allies’ (p. 89). The implication, 
in other words, was that the 1920s rapprochement was borne form relative power. However, 
it was not simply relative power that was influencing Russian and German diplomacy at this 
juncture. German-Soviet Relations also documented the economic structures which 
necessitated the shifting relationship. Matters of trade were crucial to Germany’s recovery 
from the First World War (Carr, 1951, pp. 78–79). Moreover, the increasing centralization of 
German industry coupled with Germany’s exclusion from the capitalist powers helped 
facilitate the turn eastward in terms of market access (Carr, 1951, pp. 12–13). At the same 
time, the pacification of Soviet revolutionary aims in terms of Lenin’s New Economic Policy 
was, for Carr (1951, pp. 38–39), a product of economic interests and realities. His analysis in 
German-Soviet Relations equally centred in on geopolitics, particularly with regard to 
Germany. Take his discussion of the Rapallo treaty as an example. For Carr (1951), it ‘put 
Germany back into the position which geography had assigned to her of being able to 
manoeuvre on both her flanks, alternately seeking the support of the west against the easy and 
the east against the west’ (p. 68). Germany’s geographic position, in other words, meant that 
the country was compelled to seek good relations with both, but especially its eastern 
neighbour. 
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Concerned not with ideology but with power politics 
Britain, according to the author’s preface, aimed to provide a ‘critical but not unsympathetic 
survey of British foreign policy’ (Carr, 1939, p. viii) between the wars. Although published in 
the same year as the first edition of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Britain is radically different in 
terms of its gestation period. Whereas The Twenty Years’ Crisis was conceived of in 1937 
and drew from ideas dating back to Carr’s time in Soviet Russia and before (Wilson, 2004, p. 
185), Britain was completed in 1939 after Munich. Like German-Soviet Relations, however, 
the text was littered with phrases immediately appealing to realist ears. Focusing in on British 
national interests and the German question specifically, Carr again drew from raison d'état. 
Although recognising that partisan politics had significantly shaped British policy toward 
Soviet Russia since its revolution, he nevertheless observed that ‘since [1934] policy has 
primarily been concerned not with ideologies but with what are commonly called “power 
politics”’ – in effect the German question (Carr, 1939, p. 147). 
The context – or what Carr (1964) would have called the ‘buzzing’ (p. 23) – is again 
evident. Britain is, in many respects, Carr’s mea culpa as Cox notes (Carr, 2001, p. xxvii). 
Having outlined Britain’s European strategy as ensuring the prevention of a continental 
hegemon (Carr, 1939, p. 124), Carr’s depiction of Germany in the closing passages of text, 
namely a state intent on ‘the brutal domination’ (p. 196) of Europe, is in obvious contrast to 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis. In many respects, however, Carr used Britain to defend 
appeasement in terms of inter alia relative power and capabilities. As he observed: ‘the 
armament situation made a policy of conciliation the only practical one’ (Carr, 1939, p. 176). 
The context, i.e. the developing conflict with Nazi Germany and Carr’s own ideological 
proclivities, also explain the étatist understanding democracy underpinning Britain (Jones, 
1998, p. 152), which again demonstrates the prevalence of raison d'état in Britain.  
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Geopolitics, relative power and balance of trade were also utilised by Carr in Britain. 
Britain, as already noted, focused on relative decline and the manner in which this 
constrained Britain’s capacity to act like a hegemon (Carr, 1939, pp. 21–22). Moreover, Carr 
(1939) also wrote that foreign policy ‘is always dependent on the possession of military 
strength, or rather, on the ratio between the military strength of one’s own country and that of 
others’ (p. 17). Underpinning Britain’s relative decline at this juncture was relative economic 
decline. Carr (1939) noted that the loss ‘of economic power, whether absolute or relative, 
means loss of political power’ (p. 26). In turn, Britain’s capacity for intervention became less 
(Carr, 1939, p. 21). Moreover, relative economic decline also explained Britain’s move 
toward a preventive, status quo orientated grand strategy (Carr, 1939, pp. 26–27). 
Additionally, Carr clearly believed that British policy was a product of its geographical 
location. Owing to its geographical position, Carr (1939, p. 34) contended that Britain was 
drawn into the European balance of power whenever circumstances necessitated it. In fact, he 
went as far as to suggest that Britain’s geographical location ‘determines the nature of her 
[sic] European policy’ (Carr, 1939, p. 124). He was not entirely consistent here with regard to 
the geopolitical determinism, however. Earlier in the text, as an example, he concluded that 
Britain’s role as a world as opposed to a European power was borne not from geography but 
from Britain’s specific development as an industrial-imperialist power (Carr, 1939, p. 35). 
Contemporary reconstruction: Britain, German-Soviet Relations and 
neoclassical realism 
The last point – a structure, i.e. geography, conditions but does not determine a state’s policy 
or behaviour – instinctively leads to the possibility of a conversation between Britain, 
German-Soviet Relations and neoclassical realism. Considering Carr’s lost work in light of 
neoclassical realism is apt because neoclassical realism has been argued to be ‘the only game 
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in town for the next and the current generation of realists’ (Schweller, 2003, pp. 344–345). 
Given this, it is unsurprising that neoclassical realism is firmly established in the literature so 
only a cursory introduction is necessary here (e.g. Lobell et al, 2009; Toje and Kunz, 2012a). 
Neoclassical realism seeks to explain policy rather than international outcomes. It does so by 
drawing from both the parsimony and rigour of structural realism and the diplomatic insights 
drawn from classical realism (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 4). It is a contingent theory in that it 
argues that the external structure is crucially influential in shaping a state’s conduct. Yet, 
internal dynamics (i.e. institutional capacities, the intellectual climate and bureaucratic and 
individual actors) are equally critical in terms of policy action and inaction. This is because 
they act as a transmission belt through which structural constraints and incentives are 
perceived, understood and acted upon (Rose, 1998, p. 158). This focus is logical. After all, 
‘any specific foreign policy decision…is contingent on domestic and individual unit-level 
factors’ (Lobell et al, 2015, p. 157). 
In order to assess the similarities and indeed points of departure between neoclassical 
realism and Britain and German-Soviet Relations it is necessary to render some core 
assumptions of neoclassical realism. First, neoclassical realists typically contend that the 
state’s principal priority is security in response to threat. As Dueck (2009) explains, 
neoclassical realism ‘begins by positing that state officials inevitably have some conception 
of the national interest in the face of potential external threats’ (p. 146). Second, neoclassical 
realism works with a ‘“top-down” conception of the state’ (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 25). This 
means that the state – or more appropriately the executive charged with making a state’s 
foreign policy – is driven primarily by systemic incentives and constraints. Accordingly, the 
executive ‘is potentially autonomous from society’ (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 25). Despite 
this, however, the executive is constrained by the domestic political environment, and factors 
such as public opinion, societal interest groups and other bureaucratic actors create variation 
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in how states respond to external pressure (Ripsman, 2009, pp. 171–174). Third, neoclassical 
realists, drawing from Rose’s (1998, p. 158) imperfect transmission belt analogy, highlight 
the importance of subjective perceptions. As Taliaferro and Wishart (2014) observe, leaders 
‘define “national interests” based upon their subjective assessments of the international 
distribution of power and other states’ intentions’ (p. 48). Fourth, neoclassical realists posit 
that over the long-term the policies a state pursues will reflect structural constraints and 
incentives, namely the distribution of capabilities (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 4). This is 
because the ‘position of the state in the international system defines the boundaries of the 
possible range of policies it can adopt in the long term’ (Devlen and Özdamar, 2009, p. 144). 
However, neoclassical realists believe ‘that the link between capabilities and intentions is a 
starting point and not a rigid causal relationship’ (Juneau, 2015, p. 21). The international 
structure, in other words, conditions but does not determine state behaviour (Schweller, 1998, 
p. 3). 
These ideas are evident in both Britain and German-Soviet Relations. Take the first 
principal, as an example. In Britain, Carr (1939) concluded that security is chief: ‘The 
prudent statesmen’, he wrote, ‘must…not pursue a policy which is likely to expose his 
country to war against equal or superior odds’ (p. 17). Moreover, Carr (1951, pp. 134–136) 
explained Stalin’s controversial non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany on the basis of the 
primacy of security (if the Soviet Union could not rely on the Western nations to balance the 
threat, which is what Stalin believed at that juncture, then the non-aggression pact could 
purchase immunity from Germany). Carr’s (1939, pp. 29–30, 68–69; 1951, pp. 4–13) 
discussions of the British state, particularly its relationship to and independence from 
capitalist interests, and the German state, specifically its capacity to balance competing 
groups vying for an eastern and western outlook, reflect the second neoclassical realist 
principle outlined above. The importance of perception and misperception in terms of threat 
15 
 
and others’ intentions are also evident in Britain and German-Soviet Relations (Carr, 1939, p. 
192; 1951, p. 114). Finally, in many places Carr’s lost texts illustrated the idea that the 
external environment conditioned but did not determine behaviour. This is best evidenced in 
the agency he attributed to Hitler and William II in acting contra to Germany’s geographical 
and historical traditions (Carr, 1951, p. 1). The same idea was also evident in the manner in 
which shared norms and culture meant that increasing American power was less threatening 
to Britain than increasing German power (Carr, 1939, pp. 43–44). 
If the analysis presented here is correct, then the Carr that wrote Britain and German-
Soviet Relations is a stone’s throw away from the leading realist approach in IR. At face 
value, this is hardly surprising as, inter alia, Carr is typically depicted as a leading figure that 
neoclassical realists wish to draw from (Taliaferro et al, 2009, p. 4). What is particularly 
puzzling, however, is that neoclassical realists (as realists tend to do) generally reduce Carr’s 
contribution to The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Unfortunately, as the revisionist literature has 
shown, and this paper is in agreement with, this text’s association with realism is dubious at 
best. As neoclassical realists increasingly turn toward the grand strategies of the great powers 
during the wars (Taliaferro et al, 2012), the neglect of Carr’s writings in this area is puzzling 
if not reflective of realism’s weak historical consciousness. As a corrective, greater 
recognition should be given to Britain and German-Soviet Relations in the neoclassical canon 
instead of The Twenty Years’ Crisis. 3 
There are two reasons why this re-engagement could prove fruitful. First, situating 
Carr’s forgotten texts in the neoclassical realist canon would exploit the difference between 
competing variants of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is increasingly in danger of 
becoming Waltzian neorealism plus. In fact, neoclassical realism has been argued to be a 
logical extension of neorealism because it ‘vindicate[s] Waltz [rather than] undermin[ing] 
him’ (Rathbun, 2008, p. 296). This is because neoclassical realists typically reduce the 
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external environment to anarchy and the distribution of capabilities, much as neorealism does 
(Schmidt and Juneau, 2012, p. 69). This is why the moniker neo-neorealism as opposed to 
neoclassical realism is apt for a lot self-conscious neoclassical realist work (Toje and Kunz, 
2012b, p. 8). However, the external constraints and incentives which shape a country’s 
foreign policy do not stop at neorealism’s edge (Buzan et al, 1993, pp. 29–33). The realism in 
Britain and German-Soviet Relations, which pointed to geography, history, relative power, 
ideological affinity, technology and international institutions as important conditioners of a 
state’s diplomatic conduct, offers a more extensive understanding of the external pushes and 
pulls on a country’s behaviour. This is important because the emergence ‘of a distinctly 
European realist school which draws on the roots of the historical, European tradition’ has 
recently been observed (Toje and Kunz, 2012b, p. 10). Unfortunately, only one of the 
chapters in this collection, Battisela’s (2012) discussion of Raymond Aron, seems explicitly 
concerned with employing classical works and authors to exploit the difference between the 
European and North American variants of neoclassical realism (Berenskoetter’s and Quinn’s 
(2012) chapter points to Carr, but makes the typical error of reducing Carr’s realism to The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis). The value-added worth of the recovery of some of Carr’s forgotten 
work rests in its capacity for acting as a base for broadening our understanding of 
neoclassical realism beyond neorealism. 
Second, and related, the turn to Britain and German-Soviet Relations could potentially 
overcome some of the tensions identified in marrying the parsimony of Waltz’s determinative 
structure with a more contingent and empirically richer approach to foreign policy analysis. 
Quinn (2013) contends that neoclassical realism’s focus on an ever-expanding set of unit-
level variables puts neoclassical realism on a ‘collision course’ (p. 164) with its intellectual 
baseline. His solution to this dilemma is to argue that, rather than being complementary to 
neorealism, neoclassical realism’s bolder and more authentic contribution rests in its capacity 
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for offering a challenge to neorealism (that is, by showing where and how states have, over 
the long-term, eschewed system imperatives and escaped systemic punishment) (Quinn, 
2013, pp. 176–177). Although provocative, the fork-in-the-road identified – neoclassical 
realism as either a complement to or a reaction against neorealism – continues to reproduce a 
Waltzian-centric understanding of realism, which tends to overlook the pathological 
influence that Waltz had on realism (Wohlforth, 2011). Yes, utilising Carr’s classical works 
on great power interwar diplomacy may produce more classical than neoclassical insights. 
However, this criticism only holds weight if one adopts a pejorative stance toward classical 
realism. If, on the other hand, one is more welcoming of a classical realist revival (Rynning 
and Ringsmose, 2008), then there is little to fear in turning to more traditional works. 
Conclusion 
Revisionist historiography has forced the discipline to reconsider many of its supposed 
foundational truths. E.H. Carr, arguably a pivotal thinker in the history of international 
political thought, has been caught up in this development. The revisionist turn has resulted in 
the questioning of Carr’s association with the realist tradition. Typically, realists, pointing to 
specific aspects of The Twenty Years’ Crisis, answer yes to the question of whether Carr was 
a realist. Drawing from Carr’s thought more widely, revisionists have challenged this 
depiction and, in turn, offered a more nuanced and ultimately sophisticated understanding of 
Carr. 
In terms of The Twenty Years’ Crisis there is little inaccurate with the revisionist 
literature. In fact, recovering Britain and German-Soviet Relations – as was done above – 
further bolsters the revisionist case that The Twenty Years’ Crisis has been poorly understood 
in some quarters. At the same time, however, Britain and German-Soviet Relations serve to 
highlight the incompleteness of the revisionist literature. Pointing to Carr’s more overt 
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imbibing of the realist tradition in these texts suggests that the revisionists have overlooked a 
more hard-nosed realism – a realism that did not appear as naked as say in The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis for example. Where does that leave our understanding of Carr? Given that the 
progressive aspects (the what could or even should be) of say The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 
Conditions of Peace, Nationalism and After and What is History jar with the historical-
empirical work (the what was) of Britain and German-Soviet Relations, is Carr, to borrow 
from Humphreys’ (2013) work on Waltz, a ‘theorist divided against himself’ (p. 864)? This 
hinges on whether we expect a scholar’s work to remain consistent over time. For Carr 
(1964) this was not the case: as the ‘historian himself is in flux’, just like not being able to 
step into the same river twice, two exact same ‘books cannot be written by the same 
historian’ (p. 42).  
This exercise has more relevance than simply refining our understanding of Carr’s 
contribution to IR theory. Indeed, the analysis presented above suggests close parallels 
between Britain, German-Soviet Relations and neoclassical realism. Some might say that this 
is hardly surprising; after all, Carr is one of the many classical authors that neoclassical 
realists seek to draw influence from. However, typically (if not rather puzzlingly) they only 
refer to The Twenty Years’ Crisis, which is at best loosely connected to the realist tradition. A 
more fruitful starting point for thinking about Carr and neoclassical realism rests in Britain 
and German-Soviet Relations. At the very least, the more in-depth understanding of the 
pushes and pulls on a country’s foreign policy developed in these texts would serve as a 
useful tool for those seeking to carve out a distinctly European variant of realist foreign 
policy analysis.   
19 
 
Acknowledgements 
An earlier iteration of this paper was presented at the International Relations Group, School 
of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow. The author would like to thank the 
following for their comments and suggestions: Andrew Hom, Cian O’Driscoll, Georgios 
Karyotis, Ian Paterson, Kelly Kollman, Louis Bujnoch and Ty Solomon. 
Notes 
1 Generally speaking, the revisionist literature has tended to focus on these three texts along with The 
Twenty Years’ Crisis. There are always exceptions to rules. Although providing a limited account of 
Britain, Haslam (2002, p. 149) notes that in German-Soviet Relations ‘Carr the realist was in the 
ascendant’. Jones (1998, chapter 7), in contrast, makes less use of German-Soviet Relations (although 
he does use a quotation from it to subtitle his monograph) and more of Britain in terms of building the 
case for Carr as a pragmatic realist. Molloy (2013) also draws from Britain in order to illuminate upon 
Carr’s advocacy of appeasement. This paper, while influenced by these works, develops the case 
further by situating Britain and German-Soviet Relations alongside contemporary developments in the 
realist tradition, i.e. neoclassical realism. 
2 Raison d'état refers to that ‘the belief that, where international relations are concerned, the interests of 
the state predominate over all other interests and values’ (Haslam, 2002, p. 17). Although the balance 
of trade may be the most problematic category in Haslam’s tour d’horizon, given that it may be 
awkward to think of the many political economists he refers to as belonging to one tradition, at its 
minimum it refers to the principle that ‘wealth [is] the precondition of power’ (Haslam, 2002, p. 128). 
Geopolitics, in contrast, emphasises the manner in which a state’s geographic position constraints and 
incentivises its behaviour (Haslam, 2002, p. 162). Haslam’s (2002, pp. 90–91) definition of the balance 
of power broadly follows Hume, i.e. natural equilibrium. This understanding of the balance of power 
has been called into question empirically (Kaufman et al, 2007). I, therefore, utilise the balance of 
power in terms of viewing it as a state of affairs which necessarily influences state behaviour. I draw 
from Wohlforth’s (1994) observation that realists view state behaviour as an ‘adaption to external 
constraints conditioned by changes in relative power’ (p. 96). 
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3 It should be noted that there are epistemological differences between Britain, German-Soviet Relations 
and neoclassical realism. Whilst the latter tended toward a traditionalist history, contemporary 
neoclassical realists lean toward a history without historicism where history is utilised to verify, refine 
and refute theoretical and hypothetical propositions. For this argument with regard to Carr’s later 
diplomatic histories of the Soviet Union and their relationship to realism see Smith (forthcoming). 
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